



Council of the European Union

General Secretariat

Foreign Affairs, Enlargement, and Civil Protection

Civil Protection Unit

The Integrated Political Crisis Response arrangements (IPCR) and complex crises

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The Integrated Political Crisis Response arrangements (IPCR)



Why an IPCR?

After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the realization grew within the EU that a framework was needed to coordinate responses at the highest political level to major cross-sectorial crises. The Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) arrangements were created in 2013 to fill that gap.



What is the IPCR ?

The EU crisis mechanism...

... for **cross-sectorial, complex** crises requiring coordination ...

... at **strategic/political level** in the Council / European Council



The tools:

1. **IPCR roundtable.** An informal meeting that allows the presidency to bring key actors and expertise together. Provides proposals for formal decision-making.
2. **The Integrated Situational Awareness and Analysis (ISAA) report.** Drafted by the Commission and the EEAS to provide decision makers with a common understanding of the situation.
3. **IPCR web platform.** Allows for exchanging information, including the ISAA report, situational maps, as well as stakeholders' contributions through questionnaires.
4. **A central IPCR 24/7 contact point,** established within the emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC)



The IPCR arrangements are:

- Flexible and scalable (*proportionality*)
- Based on existing procedures and working groups/committees (*no adhocery*)
- Under Presidency "political control and strategic direction" (*governance*)
- Organized around COREPER (*rapidity, cross-cutting responsibility*)



They do not:

... infringe on MS responsibilities (subsidiarity)

... replace existing sectorial arrangements
(Civil Protection Mechanism, other)

*«IPCR fully exploits synergies between
stakeholders and existing means,
structures, and capabilities at EU level»*



IPCR foreseen to be used:

- In the case of an extended interruption of service of the Schengen Information System (SIS SIRENE escalation procedures)
- In case of concerted Cyber Attacks (Blueprint)
- In case of hybrid attacks against EU MS (EU hybrid playbook)
- In case of an Art. 222 invocation (automatic activation)



Parallel and Coordinated Exercises (PACE)



Why PACE?

Through the joint declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of NATO in July 2016, the organizations pledged to work more closely on a number of issues, and “give new impetus and new substance to the NATO-EU strategic partnership”.



The PACE Concept

- Based in Common Set of Proposals endorsed by the Council of the EU and the NAC
- **Key aim:** improve EU NATO cooperation
- Parallel and coordinated concept: **not joint exercises**. EU and NATO play separate exercises, but same geopolitical setting
- Interaction taking place between EU and NATO staff.



PACE (cont.)

- In 2017, the first PACE exercise took place, under NATO lead
- In 2018, the EU was in the lead, and NATO derived from the EU exercise's geopolitical setting
- PACE is about 'Hybrid Threats', and targets cooperation on:
 - Cyber
 - Situational Awareness
 - Strategic Communication
 - Crisis Response



EU HEX-ML 18 (PACE)

- Joint effort for planning among: the Commission, SG of the Council, EEAS; coordinated with NATO staff;
- Involvement of well over 700 people in:
 - 24 EU MS
 - 13 COM DGs, incl. SG, HOME, MARE, ENER, CERT-EU, SANTE, CNECT, MOVE
 - EEAS and SG of the Council
 - 9 EU Agencies, incl. Europol, EBCGA, eu-LISA, ENISA, EFCA, EMSA, EFSA, ECDC



EU HEX-ML18 (PACE) overview

- **Conduct 5 Nov 2018 – 23 Nov 2018, CSDP planning**
- **‘Event-driven Crisis Management week 19 – 23 Nov**
- **Implementing already part of the lessons of 2017**
- **IPCR activation, including IPCR Roundtable, with third countries (Norway) and NATO**

IPCR in PACE

Scenario Overview

- Scenario has EU Internal and External dimension in three main theatres:



Africa

Mainly CSDP planning
exercise



Europe

Event-driven crisis
response exercise




Maritime

both exercises

- These theatres are connected by a series of event lines. The scenario focuses around hybrid threats, and the internal-external security nexus

The 'theatre' of EU HEX-ML 18 (PACE)



Scenario Overview

- Energy (Gas, Electricity)
- Health (gastro virus, overloaded hospitals)
- Cyber attacks (SCADA, defacement, phishing)
- CBRN (bioweapon, dirty bomb)
- Maritime security (collisions, hijacking)
- Consular Crisis Work Shop
- StratCom (disinformation, joint statements)
- Terrorism (hijacking, sabotage, collisions)
- CSDP mission planning (military and civilian)
- Interaction with NATO (at staff level) which held Trident Juncture at the same time



IPCR in PACE

IPCR in lead-in phase:


- Crisis monitoring page for 'Ropperta crisis'
- Information sharing mode for Energy/Cyber crisis
- DG HOME becomes ISAA lead
- Presidency guidance uploaded
- IPCR questionnaire uploaded

IPCR in conduct phase:

- IPCR full activation Monday
- ISAA report on Tuesday at noon
- IPCR round table Tuesday at 16:00 CET
- Debrief at COREPER Wednesday 10:00 CET
- ISAA lead handover COM > EEAS Wednesday
- Delivery of classified ISAA report to MS Thursday
- IPCR round table Thursday at 16:30
- Debrief at COREPER Friday at 10:00 CET



IPCR Statistics:



November spike of over 1,500 views more than October proves value of the platform for the players



IPCR added value:

- An integrated/inter-institutional approach
- EEAS, COM, agencies, third countries (NO), international organisations (NATO)
- Steering role for the EU Presidency on the handling of the crisis in the Council through the **IPCR Roundtable**
- Support to decision making - preparing COREPER, COUNCIL and European Council



IPCR added value (cont.):

- Cut through the ‘fog of war’ by providing a common understanding of the complex hybrid attacks
- Allow for coordination at a strategic level between the Presidency, the most affected MS, the institutions, third countries, and NATO
- All without duplicating existing mechanisms (COOL, Gas Coordination Group, UCPM)
- Prepare a strategic approach for decision-making with the 28 MS



*Thank you for
your attention*

